Learning Metonymy | lessons from emerson’s school

July 13, 2009

pragmatic whitman

Filed under: Whitman — waldo @ 6:59 pm
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Pragmatic Whitman, Stephen John Mack

available at Whitman Archive

9: Whitman’s metonymy–also tied (by Hollis) to illocutionary/performative

metonymy’s association with the sensual, concrete, particular, the physical vs. the intellectualized abstraction of metaphor

18: pragmatic conception of truth (vs. correspondence theory) prominent in LG–whitman anticipates james and dewey; pragmatic dimension to his poetics. evident in his treatment of futurity: poet where th future becomes present. future as an edited and reconstructed version of present

22: pragmatic prophecy/vision

constructed; like James: pragmatism as methodology, not philosophy. vision that understands the future it names is a contingent one: continuously construct, test and reconstruct our representations

on whitman’s ‘open road”

Dewey hints at this interrelationship in “The Development of American Pragmatism”: “Pragmatism thus has a metaphysical implication. The doctrine of the value of consequences leads us to take the future into consideration [which in turn] leads us to the conception of a universe which is, in James’ term ‘in the making,’ ‘in the process of becoming,’ of a universe up to a certain point still plastic.” 6 Dewey’s writings suggest that he regarded “pragmatism” and “democracy” to be terms that described different aspects of the same reality: whereas pragmatism describes the philosophical (and metaphysical) assumptions that warrant democratic life, democracy describes the way humans should—and sometimes do—translate these assumptions into institutional form. For Whitman, democracy was sufficient to describe it all. Simply change Dewey’s “pragmatism” in the preceding quote to “democracy” and we have a fairly good statement of Whitman’s own philosophy.

key issue for dewey and mead and james: mutual modification of subject and its environment:

In effect, Whitman has dramatized in poetry the same relationship between sense and mind that Dewey articulated in “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” the essay that provided the foundation for Mead’s theory of socialized identity. 8 There Dewey argued for an organic conception of experience and consciousness. Challenging the simplistic formulations of his contemporary psychologists who assumed that actions were always a response to some external stimulus, Dewey asserted that both stimulus and response should be viewed as mutually modifying acts within a coordinated behavioral circuit.

rethinks the optimism of pragmatism and Whtiman–by way of its tragic sense

One of the complaints that is often heard about Whitman’s poetry concerns what some regard as its cloying optimism. The same complaint, elevated to the status of criticism, is often leveled at pragmatic philosophy. The assumption is that they are both so exceedingly temperamentally optimistic that they naively reduce the complex, tragic, and ultimately insoluble mystery of existence either to a “problem” perfectly amenable to earnestly applied intelligence or to a happy scenario of evolutionary progress.

pragmatism as action:

Action is at the heart of Whitman’s pragmatism, as it is at the heart of pragmatic theory generally. It is the same pragmatic impulse, for instance, that prompted Emerson to observe in “Experience” that at Brook Farm “the noblest theory of life sat on the noblest figures of young men and maidens, quite powerless and melancholy. It would not rake or pitch a ton of hay; it would not rub down a horse; and the men and maidens it left pale and hungry.” 8 It is the same instinct that lay behind William James’s claim in Pragmatism that “the possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action.” 9 Pragmatic thinkers have characteristically held that, fundamentally, life is an activity before it is or can be anything else. Whitman’s stress on the physical, the capacity of the self to act, serves to remind us that quality in life derives in part from an ability to generate and control the activity of living.

connection to dewey in whitman’s notion of the education process in DV

Whitman’s caveat that self-governance is only possible once an individual has been “properly train’d in sanest, highest freedom” also requires some explanation. Read out of context, it might appear that Whitman has resolved Carlyle’s complaint by constructing a deus ex machina by which democracy is stabilized by expert tutelage from without. How, and by whom, is the individual to be trained? Whitman’s initial answer seems to acknowledge the need for a bureaucracy of experts: “I say the mission of government . . . is not repression alone,” he writes, “and not authority alone, . . . [but] to train communities through all their grades, beginning with individuals and ending there again, to rule themselves” (PW 380). It soon becomes clear that Whitman does not have in mind state-sponsored instruction in the political arts; rather, he is describing the way democratic government functions as an educative experience. Since people are educated for self-governance (on both social and individual levels) only through the practice of self-governance, government’s most profound mission is to maintain itself as that vehicle of training. He writes that “political democracy, as it exists and practically works in America, with all its threatening evils, supplies a training-school for making first-class men. It is life’s gymnasium, not of good only, but of all” (PW 385). This is precisely the same point that Michael Walzer makes in his defense of multiculturalism: “[i]ndividuals are stronger, more confident, more savvy,” he observes, “when they are participants in a common life, responsible to and for other people. . . . It is only in the context of associational activity that individuals learn to deliberate, argue, make decisions, and take responsibility.” 10 This is exactly the dynamic expressed by Dewey’s maxim that human knowledge is a function of the laboring process. “The exacting conditions imposed by nature that have to be observed in order that work be carried through to success,” Dewey writes, “are the source of all noting and recording of nature’s doings” (EN 102).

Whitman’s democratic models of self and society are connected through their interdependence: both are developmental, and each requires the energies of the other for its own development. Democracy is the process by which self and society nurture each other’s growth. True to his pragmatic sensibility, in other words, democracy is for Whitman what philosophy is for William James and experience is for John Dewey—a method. As such, it must forever look to the future it wishes to make better. He writes, “I submit, therefore, that the fruition of democracy, on aught like a grand scale, resides altogether in the future” (PW 390). This is an important feature of Democratic Vistas, but it should also serve as a corrective to some modern critical appraisals. Some recent critics have interpreted Whitman’s turn to the future as a measure of psychological compensation. David Reynolds, for example, writes in his cultural biography of the poet that “his evolutionary framework allowed him to deflect things to the future, and, simultaneously, to accept even the less promising facets of the present.” 11 Perhaps. But if the suggestion is that the futurist orientation of Democratic Vistas is only significant as evidence of Whitman’s desperate (and pathetic) struggle to preserve his faith in a failed democracy, then the view is misguided. Democratic Vistas only makes explicit a view of process and the future that had been latent, implicit, and developing from the first edition of Leaves of Grass (as I attempted to make clear in my discussions of “Song of Myself ” and “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry”). However much this insight may have been nurtured by psychological need, it was also necessitated by the evolving logic of his own philosophy. “Thus,” he concludes, “we presume to write, as it were, upon things that exist not, and travel by maps yet unmade, and a blank” (PW 391). In so saying, he not only describes all those who have written in the pragmatic tradition, such as Emerson, James, and Dewey, but also all who are moved to speculate on the meaning of democratic life.

other keys for pragmatism (Dewey): vision of associative life, association

[note: doesn't connect this 'method' with connotations of medium and communication--wonder about the implications of the reader, not the book, being complete]

July 10, 2009

Democratic Vistas

Filed under: Whitman, WideWorld web, pedagogy — waldo @ 7:01 pm
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Brooks on DV in the Atlantic

Berthoff, “Democratic Practice, Pragmatic Vistas” [Louise Rosenblatt, Dewey]

Rosenblatt, Louise M. “Whitman’s Democratic Vistas and the New ‘Ethnicity.’”

Yale Review 67 (1978): 199-200.

Dewey refers to WW in Public and its Problems, addressing machine as tool for communication [LW 2: 350]

whitman and dewey and educational reform

January 15, 2009

Philosophy Americana

Filed under: Emerson, dewey, notes — waldo @ 2:37 pm
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Douglas R. Anderson, Philosophy Americana: Making Philosophy at Home in American Culture (Fordham UP, 2006)

argues that the experiential and experimental language of American pragmatism (James, Dewey; informed by Emerson and transcendentalism) is a home for philosophy–a philosophy at home in the everyday. Emerson’s ‘everything good is on the highway’ as phrase for what he means to invoke by Americana

I am interested not only in the attention he gives to pragmatism/dewey and the Emersonian roots (routes?), but the way in which he focuses on teaching (his introduction). Seems to me that the point he makes about American philosophy being neglected or having a mistaken identity (and teaching being part of this, the ‘meliorative’ impusle of American philosophy; as well as its interest in the popular, its resistance to the acaemic/popular split, its revival explicitly of the Emersonian view of a scholar in the world)–similar dynamics, I would suggest, with American literary study, and perhaps education more generally. The issue of the theory/practice split (also taken up in Reason to Believe).

16: philosophy is never ‘just talk’ [might also add: literature or literary study is never mere words]: talk viewed as a crucial medium of transformation. like Dewey and James: “practicing theoreticians”; the tradition of ‘Emersonian insane angels’

see this applying to Emerson’s notion of the ‘capital secret of the profession’;

Key Dewey references thus far (his emphasis on the everyday, and experience/experiment tied to that)

MW 9:116–teacher must ‘let his mind come to close quarters with the pupil’s mind’;

MW 10: 123–’Experiment in Education: key of an experimental school ‘is precisely the idea of experiment itself, the ideal of experimental method.’ [might i tie this interest in the experimental and experience to a version of emersonian metonymy?] experiment tied to risk and loss

LW 1:18. test for philosophy: ‘Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful?’

vivid echo of Emerson’s phrase and premise (speulchres of fathers). MW 4:142 “Does Reality Possess Practical Character”

‘Under such circumstances there is danger that the philosophy which tries to escape the form of generation by taking refuge under the form of eternity will only come under the form of a bygone generation…rather than let the dead bury their own dead. Better it is for philosophy to err in active participation in the living struggles and issues of its own age…’   [Anderson comments that pragmatism as a philosophical school must be willing to lose. Refers to 'this Emersonian self-aversion.' See this in terms of the problem of the Emersonian school as well for education: but this provides a philosophical, even systematic grounding for it (in the system of pragmatism)--recognize that as philosophy--and a philosophy concerned with the fixity of belief, and for the importance of risk and experiment) we can 'bring this pragmatic attitude to bear on considerations" of teaching, education.[31] way to take this aspect of Emerson seriously, self-aversion, and not dismiss it as mere metaphor–as we might take Whtiman’s notion of the  giant that slays itself

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